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Abstract Most investigations into how people make risky choices have employed
a simple drosophila: monetary gambles involving stated outcomes and probabilities.
People are asked to make decisions from description. When people decide whether to
back up their computer hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however,
they do not enjoy the convenience of stated outcomes and probabilities. People make
such decisions either in the void of ignorance or in the twilight of their own often
limited experience of such real-world options. In the latter case, they make decisions
from experience. Recent research has consistently documented that decisions from
description and decisions from experience can lead to substantially different choices.
Key in this description–experience gap is people’s treatment of rare events. In this
paper, I briefly review studies that have documented the description–experience gap,
offer several explanations for this gap, and discuss to what extent people’s decisions
from experience are in conflict with benchmarks of rationality.
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1 Introduction
The most famous eruption of Mount Vesuvius occurred in 79 AD, destroying many
neighboring towns, among them Pompeii, the luxurious resort of wealthy Romans
and now the most renowned still-life of volcanic doom. This eruption, however, was
not the most devastating one. As recent volcanological and archaeo-anthropological
studies have revealed, the Bronze Age eruption (around 3,780 BC) covered the sur-
rounding area as far as 25 km away, burying land and villages, causing a global climatic
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disturbance and the abandonment of the entire area for centuries. Although the loss of
life and property was less extensive in the Bronze Age eruption than in the eruption of
AD 79, owing to the sparser settlements, researchers recently discovered evidence of a
massive exodus in the form of a huge number of human and animal footprints, pressed
into the ash bed and all leading away from the volcano (Mastrolorenzo et al. 2006).
At present, at least three million people live within the area that was destroyed by
the Bronze Age eruption. In fact, the periphery of Mount Vesuvius, which includes a
significant chunk of the Naples metropolitan area, is among the most populated of any
active volcano (Bruni 2003). According to Mastrolorenzo et al.’s (2006) simulations,
an eruption comparable in magnitude to the Bronze Age eruption would cause total
devastation and mortality within a radius of at least 12 km. In addition, great quantities
of fine ash in more distal zones might cause severe respiratory-tract injuries and fatali-
ties due to acute asphyxia. Although it is impossible to predict the exact probability of
such a catastrophe happening, volcanologists such as Michael Sheridan have argued
that it has been roughly 2,000 years since Pompeii, and “with each year, the statistical
probability increases that there will be another violent eruption” (Wilford 2006). In
light of these dire forecasts, one might expect that local residents would be keen to move
away from the danger zone. On the contrary, relocating residents has proven extremely
difficult, despite considerable incentives offered by the regional authorities. “In the
shadow of Vesuvius, those residents have cultivated a remarkable optimism, a tran-
scendent fatalism and a form of denial as deep as the earth’s molten core” (Bruni 2003).
How can one explain residents’ willingness to defy fate? To this end, let us turn to a
recent distinction in research on human choice. Choices between risky and uncertain
options can be made on the basis of personal experience with the options or on the
basis of their symbolic description. This distinction between decisions from experi-
ence and decisions from description matters because these two types of decisions can
result in different choices (Hertwig et al. 2004). In order to appreciate this distinction,
let us view it in light of the time-honored distinction between risk and uncertainty.
In the early twentieth century, Knight, one of the founders of the Chicago school
of economics, drew a conceptual map that, to this day, has shaped psychologists’ and
economists’ thinking about the world of uncertainty that humans navigate. In Risk,
Uncertainty, and Profit, Knight (1921, p. 215) distinguished between different types
of “probability situations,” of which two—risk and uncertainty—have attracted the
attention of psychologists and economists (see for example Edwards 1954; Epstein
and Wang 1994; Lopes 1983; Luce and Raiffa 1957). According to Luce and Raiffa, we
are in the realm of decision making under risk “if each action [of two possible actions]
leads to one of a set of possible specific outcomes, each outcome occurring with a
known probability. The probabilities are assumed to be known to the decision maker”
(p. 13). In contrast, the realm of decision making under uncertainty encompasses situ-
ations in which “either action or both has as its consequence a set of possible specific
outcomes, but where the probabilities of these outcomes are completely unknown or
are not even meaningful” (p. 13). The founder of Bayesian decision theory, Leonard
Savage, referred to such situations in which everything—including the probability
distributions—is known as “small worlds”, and distinguished them from the grand
worlds in which a person must take into account many uncertain future possibilities
when actually making her choice.
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This dichotomy between risk and uncertainty has become deeply ingrained in
economic and psychological theorizing about human choice. Knight’s (1921) nomen-
clature, however, was subtler than the simple risk–uncertainty dichotomy (see also
Runde 1998). He did not propose a dichotomy, but a trichotomy of probability situa-
tions involving (a) a priori probabilities, (b) statistical probabilities, and (c) estimates
(pp. 224 and 225). A priori probabilities refer to situations where events are identical,
finite, and equally probable, so that the probability of an event occurring can easily be
assigned via mathematical calculation, as in deducing the probability of getting a “3”
when throwing a fair die. Statistical probabilities refer to situations where events are
not necessarily identical, but can be treated as such in an empirical manner. Doing so
permits probabilities to be gauged empirically. The European Space Agency (ESA),
for instance, may wish to know how successful the European launcher technology
Ariane has proved to be. A reasonable method is for ESA to treat this risk actuari-
ally and approximate the probability of an accident from an empirical sample of past
events. The sample could, for instance, include all the 116 launches of the Ariane 4
rockets. Out of those launches, 113 were successful and ESA could conclude that the
probability of an accident using this launcher technology is .97.1
Finally, Knight’s (1921) term “estimates” refers to situations of utter uncertainty,
in which “there is no valid basis of any kind for classifying instances” (Knight 1921,
p. 225) or, in other words, where events are truly unique and probability cannot be
meaningfully applied or empirically derived. Take, for instance, two defining events of
the dramatic economic downturn in 2008. In the autumn of that year, the U.S. govern-
ment had no reasonable set of similar past events via which to assess the consequences
and likelihoods of their decision to allow the investment bank Lehman Brothers to col-
lapse. In hindsight, it is widely believed that the collapse was the catalyst triggering the
worst global economic slowdown since the 1930s. Past experience was also scant in
the second defining event: the U.S. government’s announcement of an unprecedented
$700 billion economic bailout package to prevent a global economic meltdown—“the
most expensive government intervention in history” (Herszenhorn 2008).
Knight (1921) thought the situations involving statistical probabilities to be
“extremely common”, and he emphasized that—a key point to which I will return
throughout this article—“the statistical treatment never gives closely accurate quan-
titative results” (pp. 215–216). In other words, the probabilities with which we are
typically forced to be content invariably fall short of the standards of accuracy set by
a priori probabilities. In fact, in the case of a perfect die, Knight thought it “ridiculous
to undertake to throw it a few hundred thousand times to ascertain the probability of
its resting on one face or another” (Knight 1921, p. 215). Conversely, it would be
extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to calculate from a priori principles the
chance that a building will be accidentally destroyed by, say, the eruption of a vol-
cano in a given region and at a given time. Rather, this chance must be assessed “if at
1 The statistics were retrieved in October 2009 from the ESA website (http://www.esa.int/esaCP/index.
html). Interestingly, the industries producing the Ariane launcher may arrive at quite different estimates
of risk by computing the security factor from the design features of the individual parts of the rocket (see
Gigerenzer 2002).
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all, by tabulating the results of experience” (Knight 1921, p. 215), and our (limited)
experience can be fraught with inaccuracies.
How does Knight’s trichotomy of probability situations relate to the recent distinc-
tion between decisions from description and decisions from experience (Hertwig et al.
2004)? Decisions from experience refer to probability situations in which people can-
not help but rely on their experience of previous events and their likelihoods. Decisions
from description, in contrast, refer to the choice setting as it has been implemented
countless times in the laboratories of psychologists and economists: People are pre-
sented with gambles that are characterized in terms of their monetary outcomes and
stated a priori probabilities—probabilities akin to those involved in the roll of a die or
the spin of a roulette wheel.
Take, for example, Allais’ (1953) classic article on “The foundations of a positive
theory of choice involving risk”. Herein, he described a person who tenders successive
















That is, the person encounters four options, each involving explicitly stated outcomes
and a priori probabilities. Outside the laboratory, rare are situations that involve explic-
itly stated probabilities (there are a few exceptions involving explicitly stated, statis-
tical probabilities such as probabilistic weather forecasts; see Gigerenzer et al. 2005).
Most of the time, people can only call upon some sense of events’ statistical prob-
ability, garnered from their or others’ experience. Notwithstanding its ubiquity, this
situation has received scant attention in recent research on risky choice (although see
Busemeyer 19852; Katz 1962; Myers and Katz 1962; Myers and Sadler 1960). Only
recently has this blind spot begun to be eliminated with the advent of a new, simple
experimental tool that has enabled psychologists to study how people make choices
when probabilities are not explicitly stated.
2 A new experimental tool and the description–experience gap
The simplest version of this tool presents respondents with two gambles on a computer
screen. A box represents each gamble, which contains a set of outcomes that occur
with some probability. People are not told anything about the properties of the gam-
bles, but are allowed to explore each by sampling from them. Specifically, clicking
on a box triggers a random draw of an outcome from the associated set of outcomes.
People are encouraged to sample until they feel confident enough to decide which box
2 In the 1950s and early 1960s, prior to the advent of modern behavioral decision research, decision
scientists investigated decisions from experiences and focused on questions such as whether people man-
age to learn the probability structure over outcomes (for a review see Luce and Suppes 1965). Hertwig and
Erev (2009) speculated that the impracticability of the designs (purportedly hundreds of trials are needed
before behavior will stabilize) and the then newly discovered focus on violations of expected utility (with
the requirement of conveying perfect information about the probabilities of rare events) may explain why
researchers in psychology began to study, nearly exclusively, decisions from description.
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is “better”, in the sense that they would prefer to draw from it during a final trial involv-
ing real monetary payoffs. This paradigm represents a situation in which respondents
successively find out which outcomes occur and can—if they choose to—approximate
probabilities from their experienced samples.3 In Knight’s (1921) terminology, they
would thus extract a sense of the statistical probabilities, and make decisions from
experience. Note, however, that they can arrive at their choices without forming an
explicit representation of their encountered statistical probabilities—an issue to which
I will return later.
In studies using this experimental and related experience-based tools, a systematic
and robust “description–experience gap” has emerged.4 The gap describes the observa-
tion that respondents who make decisions from experience have different preferences
concerning options involving rare events than respondents who make decisions from
description (involving stated outcomes and probabilities, as in the case of Allais’
(1953) gambles). For example, across six problems, Hertwig et al. (2004) found that
the average (absolute) difference between the choice proportions of an experience and
a description group was 36 percentage points. This gap has been replicated in a num-
ber of other studies that used the same or slightly modified experimental procedures
(and it also has been observed in the partial-feedback and full-feedback paradigm;
see Footnote 1). Table 1 shows the magnitude of the description–experience gap in
those studies. In the majority of problems, the same key result emerged (right-most
column): Although rare events appear to be receive more weight than they deserve
in decisions from description (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman
1992), they receive less impact than they deserve according to their objective proba-
bilities in decisions from experience.
One immediate consequence of this reversed impact of rare events is that the four-
fold pattern (the common pattern of risk seeking and risk aversion observed in choices
between simple, described options) is reversed. Let us consider the fourfold pattern in
more detail. The classic model of decisions under risk, expected utility theory, assumes
that individuals are generally risk-averse. However, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
showed that people are both: risk averse and risk seeking. The fourfold pattern summa-
rizes these conflicting risk attitudes as follows: In decisions from description, people
are generally risk averse when the probability of winning is high but risk seeking when
3 Arló-Costa and Helzner (2009) showed how this paradigm can be modified to study decisions from
experience in the case of uncertainty.
4 Within research on decisions from experience, three types of experimental paradigms have been used
(see Hertwig and Erev 2009). In the sampling paradigm, people merely make a single consequential choice
subsequent to having terminated information search. Thus, their decision is one-shot in nature, and they do
not face a tradeoff between exploring and exploiting options (see Berry and Fristedt 1985; Daw et al. 2006).
If people make repeated consequential choices, they have to strike a balance between exploring alterna-
tives and exploiting them. The partial-feedback paradigm investigates this tradeoff, which adds a different
dynamic to decision making, and also makes such repeated choices distinct from decisions from description.
Specifically, the diminished impact of rare events found in one-shot experience-based decisions, relative to
description-based decisions, has also been observed in the partial-feedback design (e.g., Barron and Erev
2003; Erev and Barron 2005). The full-feedback paradigm is identical to the previous design, except that is
also provides feedback concerning the forgone payoffs (i.e., the payoffs that the person would have received,
had she chosen the other option). Choices similar to those in the other two experienced-based paradigms
have been observed.
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Table 1 The reality of the description–experience gap (adapted from Hau et al. 2010)










Hertwig et al. 2004 6 15 36 6/6
Hau et al. 2008 1 6 11 27 6/6
2 6 33 13 6/6
3 6 Set to 100 17 5/6
Weber et al. 2004 Experiment 1 vs. experiment 2 5 17 23 2/2
Rakow et al. 2008 Objective description 12 15 27 11/12
Percentage sample descriptionc 12 15 7 9/12
Frequency sample descriptionc 12 15 7 7/12
Ungemach et al. 2009 Free sampling 6 19 31 6/6
Matched samplingd 6 Set to 80e 15 4/6
Gottlieb et al. 2007 One-by-one vs. percentaged 16 Set to 20e 11 2/4
a The description–experience gap is measured as the mean absolute difference between choice proportions
in the description and experience conditions
b This column indicates how many of the differences between the description and experience conditions
are consistent with the thesis that rare events have less impact on decisions from experience than on deci-
sions from description (Hertwig et al. 2004); only problems for which a clear prediction can be derived are
considered
c Description and decisions from experience groups were yoked, thus eliminating sampling error as an
explanation for the gap
d Samples were chosen such as to reflect the objective probabilities, thus eliminating sampling error
e Termination of search was not determined by respondents but by experimenters
it is low. In addition, people are risk averse when the probability of losing is low but risk
seeking when it is high. Table 2 exemplifies the fourfold pattern (see Tversky and Fox
1995). Choices consistent with this pattern have been observed in studies investigat-
ing decisions from description (e.g., Hershey and Schoemaker 1980; Wehrung 1989).
Instead of exclusively explaining this pattern in terms of the shape of the utility func-
tion (e.g., Friedman and Savage 1948; Markowitz 1952), some authors have shifted the
burden of explanation from the utility function to the assumption of nonlinear trans-
formation of probabilities (Edwards 1962). Nonlinear treatment of probabilities is also
one of the main pillars of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman 1992), currently the most influential descriptive account of risky choice.
Prospect theory assumes an inverse S-shaped weighting function, thus postulating
overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of moderate and high proba-
bilities. The theory, for instance, can thus explain simultaneous insurance purchasing
and gambling—two behaviors that imply opposite risk attitudes and are hard to explain
in terms of expected utility theory—by overweighting of small probabilities (of losses
in the case of insurance purchasing and of gains in the case of gambling).
In decisions from experience, the fourfold pattern is reversed, as illustrated in
Table 3. In Hertwig et al. (2004), the majority of respondents behaved risk seeking
when the probability of winning was high but risk averse when it was low. At the same
time, they behaved risk seeking when the probability of losing was low but risk averse
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Table 2 The fourfold pattern in decisions from description
Probability Gain Loss
Low C(100, .05) = 14 C(−100, .05) = −8
Risk seeking Risk aversion
High C(100, .95) = 78 C(−100, .95) = −84
Risk aversion Risk seeking
Note C(100, .05) represents the median certainty equivalent for the gamble to win $100 with probability
p = .05, otherwise nothing (based on Tversky and Fox 1995)
Table 3 The reversed fourfold pattern in decisions from experience
Probability Gain Loss
Low 32, .1 vs. 3, 1.0 −32, .1 vs. −3, 1.0
Risk aversion: 20% Risk seeking: 72%
Rare event: 32, .1 Rare event: −32, .1
High 4, .8 vs. 3, 1.0 −4, .8 vs. −3, 1.0
Risk seeking: 88% Risk aversion: 44%
Rare event: 0, .2 Rare event: 0, .2
Note Choice proportions refer to the percentage of choices of the risky option in each pair of gambles (based
on Hertwig et al. 2004)
when it was high. Assuming for the moment nonlinear transformation of probability,
it appears as though the S-shaped weighting function, assumed by prospect theory, is
reversed. In other words, in choices involving statistical probabilities, people behave
as if they underweight small probabilities and overweight moderate and high prob-
abilities. Reversed nonlinear probability weighting, however, is only one of several
possible explanations of the description–experience gap. In what follows, I review and
discuss the following non-exclusive explanations for the description–experience gap:
(a) reliance on small samples, (b) weighting of probabilities, and (c) format-dependent
cognitive heuristics (see also Hertwig and Erev 2009).
3 Why do decisions from experience and description diverge?
Humans are the only animals that have the ability to process abstract, symbolic rep-
resentations of risky prospects. Other animals’ decisions (e.g., about where to forage)
are by necessity experience-based. Weber et al. (2004) reported some striking sim-
ilarities in the choices of humans and lower animals when humans are placed in
situations in which they, like all other animals, must make decisions from experience.
Take, for example, the foraging decisions of bumblebees in the context of different
floral reward distributions. Tacitly assuming that bumblebees operate on some repre-
sentation of experienced (statistical) probabilities, Real (1991) concluded from their
foraging behavior that “bumblebees underperceive rare events and overperceive com-
mon events” (p. 985), and explained this pattern as a consequence of the fact that
“bees frame their decisions on the basis of only a few visits” (Real 1992, p. S133). As
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we see shortly, people, like bumblebees, also frame their choice between two payoff
distributions on the basis of frugal information foraging. In fact, reliance on small sam-
ples has been a robust finding in investigations of decisions from experience. In what
follows, I will discuss several possible explanations for the description–experience
gap; reliance on the small samples is the first.
3.1 Reliance on small samples and sampling error in decisions from experience
How small is small? Hertwig et al. (2004) observed that the typical number of draws
that respondents made was approximately 7 from each payoff distribution (henceforth,
gamble) and a median of 15 across both distributions. As Table 1 shows, subsequent
studies observed similarly small samples, with the exception of Study 2 in Hau et al.
(2008)—a study to which I return shortly. Sample sizes in the range between 11 and
19 draws (across both distributions) are fairly small given that each draw takes only a
few seconds, and given that small samples have two obvious consequences: First, the
smaller the number of draws, the larger the probability that a decision maker will never
come across rare events, remaining ignorant of their existence. In fact, across the six
problems investigated by Hertwig et al., rare events were not encountered in 44% of
all samples. Second, small samples also make it more probable that one will encounter
the rare event less frequently than expected given its objective probability. Averaged
across problems, Hertwig et al. observed that 78% of respondents encountered the
rare event less frequently than expected (i.e., fewer than np times) whereas merely
22% of respondents encountered the rare event as frequently or more frequently than
expected.
The reason for this underrepresentation of rare events in small samples is that the
binomial distribution for the number of times a particular outcome will be observed in
n independent trials is skewed when p is small (i.e., the event is rare) and n is small (i.e.,
few outcomes are sampled). For such distributions, one is more likely to encounter the
rare event less frequently than expected (np) than more frequently than expected (for
details, see Hertwig et al. 2006). Figure 1 illustrates this systematic distortion in the
sample probabilities. It plots the binomial sample probabilities as a function of three
sets of sample sizes. As shown in the graph, the sample probabilities underrepresent
the rare events and overrepresent common events. The smaller the sample size, the
stronger this symmetrical effect.
These observations suggest that it is not necessary to assume that people
weight probabilities differently in decisions from description and experience,
respectively. The grounds for the description–experience gap may already be
laid when the mind tries to estimate the statistical probabilities based on small
samples. Samples of experience introduce error via the sampling process, and there-
fore statistical probabilities will not be as accurate as a priori probabilities. Sampling
error is, of course, larger the smaller the sample, and the less common the event in
question. The different impact of rare events in decisions from experience, relative to
decisions from description, might thus stem exclusively from their systematic under-
representation in small samples, as has been suggested by, for instance, Fox and Hadar
(2006) and Rakow et al. (2008), rather than their underweighting.
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Fig. 1 Binomial sample probabilities as a function of three sample sizes (n = 1–4, n = 5–9, n = 10–15).
The values represent the sample probabilities averaged across the respective sample sizes. For instance, the
binomial sample probability for sample size 1–4 and objective probability .2 amounts to .108. This value
represents the 25%-trimmed mean, averaging all values from the 25th to the 75th quantile
If, indeed, the only culprit behind the description–experience gap were sampling
error, then there would be two straightforward strategies for reducing and even
eliminating the gap. One would be to have people sample more, and to see whether the
gap gets smaller. The other would be to make decisions from experience and decisions
from description strictly equivalent. Both tests of this sampling-error explanation of
the description–experience gap have been conducted.
3.1.1 Does more experience reduce the gap?
Hau et al. (2008) tested the impact of extensive experience in two studies. In one,
they increased the payoffs by an order of magnitude, relative to Hertwig et al. (2004).
With more at stake, respondents were eager to sample more: a median of 33 times
across both payoff distributions (Table 1, Study 2). More experience decreased the
description–experience gap, from 27 (Study 1) to 13 percentage points in Study 2.
Could one reduce the gap even more by having people acquire even larger sam-
ples of experience? Hau et al. (2008) further boosted respondents’ search efforts by
instructing them to sample a total of 100 times from both payoff distributions. How-
ever, tripling the sample effort—from 33 draws to 100 draws—did not further shrink
the gap (17 percentage points; Table 1, Study 3). This set of results suggests that
sampling error contributes substantially to the gap but is not solely responsible for it.
Why does extensive experience not do away with the description–experience gap?
One possible explanation is that, paradoxically, people continue to rely on small
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samples even if they garner more experience. How so? There is evidence in research
on memory and belief-updating (see Hogarth and Einhorn 1992, for a review) that
observations encountered early or late in a sequence of information receive more
weight than they deserve (i.e., more than 1/n). Consistent with such order effects,
Hertwig et al. (2004) found that observations that people encountered in the second
half of the sequence of n observations had more impact on the ultimate choice than
draws encountered earlier. This recency effect makes the functional sample size of
observations from which people derive choices small, regardless of how much infor-
mation they initially sampled. Despite the elegant relationship between small samples
and recency effect, one should not overstate the latter’s importance. Unlike Hertwig
et al., Hau et al. (2008) and Rakow et al. (2008) found its impact on the description–
experience gap to be quite limited.
3.1.2 Does strictly equivalent probability information eliminate the gap?
Another test of the impact of sampling error on the description–experience gap is to
describe one person’s experienced sample probabilities to another person (that is, the
very probabilities that occurred in the sample). These “twins” are thus yoked, facing
exactly the same probabilities and outcomes (see Rakow et al. 2008). The only dif-
ference is the format of information: one person experiences probabilities in terms
of sequentially sampling events, one by one; the other will learn about probabilities
in terms of summary descriptions. With the sampling error thus included into stated
(described) probabilities, the twins’ choices should no longer differ. Indeed, in the
first study that implemented a yoked design the gap disappeared (Rakow et al. 2008).
A later study, however, found a different result. In Hau et al.’s (2010) implementa-
tion, each participant in the experience group made five choices per problem, having
sampled 5, 10, 20, 35, and 50 outcomes, respectively. Twins in the description group
made the same five choices. The two key results were as follows: With very little
experience (5 draws), choices in both the groups closely tracked each other. With
extensive experience (50 draws), however, choices of the yoked description group
became increasingly dissimilar to those of the experience group. To put it differently,
when sampling error was pronounced (small sample), the description–experience gap
disappeared, but when sampling error was small (large sample), the gap reappeared.
One possible explanation for this puzzling effect is a phenomenon analyzed by
Hertwig and Pleskac (2008). They showed that when people rely on small samples, they
experience a difference between options’ average rewards (i.e., the sample means) that
can be substantially larger than the difference in the expected values of the described
options. Take, for example, the first yoked-design study by Rakow et al. (2008). Based
on a median sample of 15 outcomes, the median absolute difference between the
sample means in their study was 2, more than 15 times the size of the median dif-
ference between the objective expected values of 0.125 (presented in their decisions
from description condition; see Hau et al. 2010 for this reanalysis). This amplifica-
tion effect eases the difficulty of choosing between options (Hertwig and Pleskac
2010), and appears to be one factor that makes people content with relatively small
samples in decisions from experience investigations. For small samples, however, the
amplification effect can become so large that when one introduces sampling error
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and, by extension, amplification into yoked decisions from description, then those
choices can become trivial and the description–experience gap disappears (as Rakow
et al. observed); if, however, the sampling error and the amplification effect become
smaller (as in the case of the large samples studied by Hau et al.) the gap reappears.
After this short excursion into the amplification effect, let us return to the attempt
to make the probability information in decisions from experience and description
strictly equivalent. Beyond the yoked design, one can achieve such equivalence by
fixing people’s sampling experience. Ungemach et al. (2009) had people sample 80
draws and, in addition, they devised the experienced probabilities such that they were
identical to the stated objective probabilities seen by other respondents who were
asked to make decisions from descriptions. A substantial gap occurred.
Let us recap what we know thus far. Unless people have a strong incentive to
sample extensively or are instructed to do so, they, like Real’s (1991) bumblebees,
consistently rely on relatively small samples. Small samples exact the price of sam-
pling error (Fig. 1). Systematic disparities between the experienced sample probabil-
ities and the described objective probabilities account for a substantial portion of the
description–experience gap. However, the underrepresentation of rare events in small
samples is not the whole story, as Hau et al. (2008, 2010) and Ungemach et al. (2009)
demonstrated. What other factors contribute to the gap?
3.2 Are experienced probabilities weighted and weighted differently than stated
probabilities?
In a classic review, written merely seven years after Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947) formalized expected utility theory in their Games and Economic Behavior,
Edwards (1954) discussed empirical findings indicating that expected utility theory
was descriptively inadequate. One set of conflicting findings dealt with how people
appear to treat probabilities. Preston and Baratta (1948), for instance, found prelimi-
nary evidence that people overweight small probabilities and underweight large prob-
abilities. In 1962, Edwards proposed the replacement of probabilities with weights,
and in 1979 Kahneman and Tversky proposed a comprehensive model of decision
making under risk (later extended to decision making under uncertainty; Tversky and
Fox 1995). One major component of their prospect theory is Edwards’ notion of deci-
sion weights, which “measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects,
and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events” (Kahneman and Tversky
1979, p. 280). The probability-weighting function, π (.) describes how different levels
of stated (described) probability contribute to the evaluation of a gamble’s desirabil-
ity. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumed the following one-parameter form of the
weighting function:





)1/γ , if x ≥ 0
pδj(
pδj +(1−p j)δ
)1/δ , if x <0.
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Fig. 2 Weighting functions for decisions from description and decisions from experience. The weighting
functions for gains (w+) and losses (w−), respectively, with the parameters estimated from Hertwig et al.’s
(2004) data and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), respectively. Note that w+ is visually indistinguishable
from the light grey diagonal that indicates linear weighting; w− is slightly more S-shaped. From Hau et al.
(2008, p. 512). Copyright Wiley-Blackwell, UK. Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder
The γ and δ parameters are adjustable and characterize the shape of the function for
gains and losses, respectively. Both parameters are typically assumed to range between
0 and 1, resulting in an inverse S-shape. Tversky and Kahneman fitted this form to
cash-equivalent data and derived the median estimates of γ = 0.61, and δ = 0.69,
respectively. The resulting weighting function is plotted in Fig. 2.
Could it be that another contributory factor to the description–experience gap is
that the weighting function takes on a different shape in experience-based choices?
To the best of my knowledge, there are currently only two published attempts to fit
Tversky and Kahneman’s one-parameter form of the weighting function to decisions
from experience. Hau et al. (2008) varied the adjustable parameters (including those
of the value function) in steps of 0.01 between 0 and 1 and calculated the number of
correct “predictions” for each value or combination of values. Then, they selected the
set of parameters that produced the maximum number of correctly predicted choices,
namely, γ = .99, δ = .93. Figure 2 shows the resulting weighting function. It no
longer has the characteristic S-shape. Instead, the optimal parameters imply nearly
linear weighting of probabilities. That is, the objective probability scale and the deci-
sion weight scale almost perfectly map onto each other. Using a similar procedure
(Ungemach et al. (2009); Fig. 1) found that the best fit to the observed experience-
based choices was reached with parameter values, implying underweighting of rare
events.
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Both analyses suggest that the experienced probabilities—to the extent that they
play a role at all in how people make choices—are treated differently than stated
probabilities. Hau et al.’s (2008) analysis suggests that experienced probabilities may
contribute linearly to the evaluation of a gamble, and therefore, there may be no need to
replace experienced probabilities with weights. Ungemach et al.’s (2009) analysis sug-
gests that rare events may—on top of being underrepresented in small samples—also
be underweighted in experience-based choices. One final remark is in order: With the
impact of prospect theory, the assumption of an inverse S-shaped probability weight-
ing has attained the status of a cut-and-dried fact in many researchers’ minds. Yet,
there are theories of risky choice that successfully predict people’s description-based
risky choices without assuming any nonlinear probability weighting function (e.g.,
Brandstätter et al. 2006).
3.3 Are people’s estimate of their experienced probabilities systematically biased?
In theory, the description–experience gap could also be the consequence of a sys-
tematic estimation error, with people systematically underestimating the frequencies
of the rare event experienced in the sample. Two sets of results fail to support this
possibility. First, across a wide range of studies of frequency and probability assess-
ments, people have consistently been found to overestimate rare events (see Hertwig
et al. 2005 and the many references therein). Second, studies that have explicitly asked
people to report their estimates of the likelihood of rare events in the samples they
experienced found the estimates to be well calibrated or a little too high, relative to
the actually experienced frequency (Hau et al. 2008; Ungemach et al. 2009). Thus
there is no evidence for a systematic discrepancy between the actually experienced
frequencies in the sample and people’s estimates thereof that could explain the descrip-
tion–experience gap. The fact that people’s estimates are quite accurate is consistent
with the notion that encoding of frequency information is an inevitable consequence
of attending to events, and is thus “obligatory” (Zacks and Hasher 2002, p. 34). The
availability of frequency knowledge, however, does not mean that its use in making a
choice is obligatory—a point to which I now turn.
3.4 Format-dependent cognitive strategies
The previous discussions on probability estimation and weighting rest on a premise:
In the process of sampling outcomes, respondents form a mental representation of
the relative frequency (probability) with which events occur. Combined with outcome
information, these probabilities then enter the evaluation of the gambles’ desirability.5
Do decisions from experience, however, inevitably give rise to an explicit representa-
5 The assumption that people form an explicit representation of the probability distributions suggests the
possibility that in light of insufficient information to identify a unique probability distribution, people’s rep-
resentation of uncertainty could better be modeled in terms of imprecise probabilities (e.g., Walley 1991).
To the best of my knowledge, this link between decisions from experience and imprecise probabilities and
decision rules operating on them (e.g., Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982; Levi 1974) has not been elaborated.
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tion of probabilities? Like descriptive theories of risky choice that retain the expected
utility scaffolding such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), disappointment theory (Bell 1985;
Loomes and Sugden 1986), and decision affect theory (Mellers 2000), expected util-
ity theory postulates that human choice can or should be modeled by assuming that
people behave as if they multiplied some function of probability and value, and then
maximized. Applied to decisions from experience, these models demand explicit rep-
resentation of probabilities. There are, however, at least two classes of descriptive
theories that assume that the decision maker can and will do without probabilities:
associative learning models and outcome heuristics.
3.4.1 Associative learning models
In this theory class, human choice is conceptualized as a learning process (see e.g.,
Busemeyer and Myung 1992; Bush and Mosteller 1955). Learning consists in changing
the propensity to select a gamble based on the experienced outcomes. Good experi-
ences boost the propensity of choosing the gamble associated with them, and bad
experiences diminish it (e.g., Barron and Erev 2003; Denrell 2007; Erev and Barron
2005; March 1996). Two associative-learning models have been proposed to capture
decisions from experience.
The value-updating model (Hertwig et al. 2006) assumes that learners update their
estimates of the value of the gamble after each new draw from it. Specifically, the
model computes the weighted average of the previously estimated value and the value
of the most recently experienced outcome. The model consists of two steps:
Step 1. Set your initial expectation about the values A j (0) of gamble j to zero. After
the t th draw from it, update its value according to the following term:
A j (t) = (1 − ωt ) A j (t − 1) + (ωt ) (xt ) , (2)
where A j (t) represents the value of the gamble j after t samples are drawn;
A j (t − 1) represents the value based on the t − 1 previously sampled out-
comes; and xt is the value of the most recent outcome. The weight accorded
to the newly drawn outcome is ω = (1/t)φ , where φ is a recency parameter.
If φ = 1, all outcomes are equally weighted; if φ < 1, more recent outcomes
receive more weight, implying a recency effect; and if φ > 1, earlier outcomes
receive more weight, implying a primacy effect.6
Step 2. Once sampling is terminated, select the gamble with the highest value.
The model includes two parameters, namely, the number of draws and the recency
parameter. The former parameter is determined empirically, and the second is adjust-
able (i.e., fitted to the data). Importantly, the model does not require representation of
probabilities.
6 Hertwig et al. (2006) also assumed that the experienced values are transformed using cumulative prospect
theory’s value function. However, this assumption does not appear to boost its predictive power (Hau et al.
2008); I drop it here.
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Weber et al. (2004) used another associative learning model, the fractional adjust-
ment model (March 1996) to describe the learning process in decisions from experi-
ence. It consists of the following two steps:
Step 1. Set the initial propensity p j,0 to choose each gamble to 0.5. Increment the
propensity of choosing gamble j after sampling trial t according to the obser-
vation of the payoff, x j , using the following rule,
p j,t =
{
1 − [(1 − α)x j (1 − p j,t−1)] if x j ≥ 0
p j,t−1 (1 − α)x j if x j < 0.
Parameter α is adjustable and controls the degree of learning. It is bound
between 0 and 1. If α = 0, then there will be no learning.
Step 2. Choose gamble j with probability p(j).
This model also assumes number of draws and the recency as parameters. The former
is determined empirically and the second fitted to the data. As with the value-updating
model, this model does not require an explicit representation of probabilities. Both
associative-learning models assume that initial impressions are continuously updated
in a way that gives recent events more weight than temporally remote events (the value-
updating model also permits primacy). Because rare events have a small(er) probability
of having occurred recently, they tend (on average) to have a smaller impact on the
decision than their objective likelihood of occurrence would warrant.
3.4.2 Cognitive heuristics
A class of model that aims to describe both process and outcome of choice is cogni-
tive choice heuristics (see Brandstätter et al. 2006). Heuristics can be separated into
two classes: those that use solely outcome information and ignore probabilities (out-
come heuristics), and those that use at least rudimentary probability information (dual
heuristics). Outcome heuristics such as maximax and minimax (Luce and Raiffa 1957;
Savage 1954/1972) were originally proposed as models for decisions under ignorance
in which people have no information whatsoever about probabilities. Another cogni-
tive heuristic that focuses on outcomes is the natural-mean heuristic (Hertwig and
Pleskac 2008). It works as follows:
Step 1. Calculate the natural mean of outcomes for both gambles by summing, sep-
arately for each gamble, all n experienced outcomes and then dividing by
n.
Step 2. Choose the gamble with the larger natural mean (i.e., the gamble that had the
best average outcome in the sampling phase).
The natural-mean heuristic was originally proposed in the context of n-armed bandit
problems (Sutton and Barto 1998) as a simple method for estimating the values of
actions (e.g., the play of one of a slot machine’s levers), and for using the estimates
to select between actions: “the true value of an action is the mean reward received
when the action is selected. One natural way to estimate this is by averaging the
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rewards actually received when the action was selected” (Sutton and Barto 1998,
p. 27). The natural-mean heuristic has two interesting properties: (a) It is well tailored
to sequentially encountered outcomes. (b) It arrives at the same choice prediction as
the expected-value calculus assuming the latter is applied to sampled probabilities and
outcomes. Notwithstanding the equivalent outcome, the process, however, is radically
different (Hoffman 1960). The heuristic, instead of keeping track of all outcomes, tal-
lying their relative frequencies, multiplying outcomes and probabilities, and summing
the values across each gamble, tots up all experienced rewards (or losses) per gamble
and then divides this sum by the sample size per gamble to arrive at the “natural mean.”
One interpretation of the natural-mean heuristic is that in decisions from experience
it is a simple and psychologically plausible—in particular, in continuous outcome
distributions—instantiation of the expected-value calculus.
In light of these models that do not demand explicit representations of probabili-
ties, let us return to the question of what the possible co-determinants of the descrip-
tion–experience gap are. The two associative-learning models and the natural-mean
heuristic are format-dependent. That is, they cannot capture decisions from descrip-
tion, because the input into these models consists of a sequence of outcomes that are
being integrated into one summary measure. They have no conceptual parameters to
take probability information into account, and, in fact, probabilities are not directly
put on view in decisions from experience. In decisions from description, in contrast,
probabilities are explicitly displayed in front of decisions makers. As a consequence,
differences in description- and experience-based choices could partly arise because
different formats of mathematically equivalent information trigger different cogni-
tive strategies (see Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, for a related argument in Bayesian
reasoning).
Consistent with this possibility, Hau et al. (2008, Fig. 6) observed in a model
competition involving 16 choice models for decisions from experience that the for-
mat-dependent natural-mean heuristic emerged as one of the four most competitive
models. Among these best models were also two other heuristics, the maximax and
the lexicographic heuristics. They are not format-dependent. In theory, they can be
applied to both kinds of decisions. In reality however, people appear to recruit them
in experience- but not in description-based choices. In another model competition,
which involved description-based choices (Brandstätter et al. 2006, Fig. 7), both heu-
ristics performed dismally. Thus, the maximax heuristic, which requires no probability
information, and the lexicographic heuristic, which requires merely ordinal probability
information, appear to be good candidate strategies in decisions from experience but
not in decisions from description. The only model that appears to be simultaneously
a good model for both kinds of decisions is cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992). However, in Hau et al.’s competition, it only performed well assum-
ing linear probability weighting (Fig. 2). And with linear weighting (and ignoring the
value function that did not much affect predictive performance), the natural-mean
heuristic is mathematically equivalent to cumulative prospect theory. In terms of the
implied cognitive processes, however, they are radically different.
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3.5 Summary
Humans are unique in their ability to make risky choices based on symbolic descrip-
tions of the alternatives. Convenient descriptions of outcomes and probabilities, how-
ever, are rarely available. Most of the time, we need to content ourselves with the
chance of exploring the alternatives, thus getting a sense of the alternatives’ possible
outcomes and their statistical probabilities. In recent research, these different formats
of risky information have consistently yielded diverging choices when the alternatives
involve rare events. What causes this description–experience gap? Several factors
have been investigated. Undoubtedly, sampling error and people’s default reliance on
small samples account for a substantial portion of the gap but not for all of it. Larger
samples do not appear to make the gap disappear. Three non-exclusive factors may
prevent extensive experience from closing the gap. First, due to order effects such
as recency or primacy, only part of extensive experience may guide our evaluations.
Second, tallied relative frequencies and a priori probabilities may be weighted differ-
ently. Third, the different information formats underlying decisions from experience
and description may trigger different cognitive strategies. It is too early to tell which
of these factors (or any other) accounts for that part of the description–experience gap
that cannot be explained in terms of sampling error. Once we fully understand the
causes of the gap, however, we will also understand the cognitive processes recruited
in experience-based choice.
4 How rational are decisions from experience?
It was not long after Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formalized expected
utility theory that the first investigations were conducted to test whether people’s
choices conform to the theory’s predictions. Evidence promptly emerged that peo-
ple’s choices systematically violate expected utility theory (e.g., Allais 1953; Ellsberg
1961; MacCrimmon 1968; Mosteller and Nogee 1951; Preston and Baratta 1948). In
subsequent decades, more demonstrations of violations were entered onto a growing
list (Edwards 1968; Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Although the specific violations
and their normative implications are still under debate (e.g., Allais 1979), a widespread
consensus has emerged among decision scientists in psychology, that human behavior
is often inconsistent with the predictions of expected utility theory.7
How does the brief history of research on decisions from experience compare to
the long saga of violations in research on decisions from description? How rational
or boundedly rational (Simon 1982) do people appear when rendering decisions from
7 The extent to which people’s choices are inconsistent with expected utility theory and expected value
theory, however, is quite unclear. In a reanalysis of 450 choice problems with a large variability in expected
values (studied by Mellers et al. 1992), Brandstätter et al. (2006) found that with larger ratios between
the expected values of the two gambles per problem, the expected value theory predicted people’s choice
extremely well. Depending on whether one analyzes selected problems (opportunistic sampling) or a large
set of randomly or systematically constructed problems, one may arrive at quite different conclusions. In
evaluating the validity of models of risky choice, it is important to keep in mind that it is always possible to
construct problems that trigger choices that a given model—be it the expected utility calculus, cumulative
prospect theory, or cognitive heuristics—can and cannot explain (see Brandstätter et al. 2008).
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experience? To attempt an answer to this question, let us turn to one substantial bench-
mark of rationality, namely, the assumption that rational agents form, on average,
correct beliefs about events in their environment. In investigations on decisions from
experience, people fall short of this benchmark. As Table 1 shows, several studies
have demonstrated that agents are content with relatively small samples—samples so
small that rare events go unnoticed or are underrepresented. To the extent that people
form beliefs about the likelihood of events, people relying on small samples cannot
help but form inaccurate beliefs about rare events (and by extension, common events).
Possibly related to these inaccurate likelihood beliefs, people chose the option with
the higher expected value in, for instance, Hertwig et al.’s (2004) study in merely 41%
of cases.
There are at least three interpretations of people’s apparent failure to form cor-
rect beliefs about event probabilities in their environment. One is that they are naïve
intuitive statisticians. We are intuitive statisticians insofar as our cognitive machin-
ery enables us to extract exquisitely accurate information from the samples drawn
from the world (e.g., Zacks and Hasher 2002). However, we are naïve insofar as we
appear to take “the information input for granted, failing to correct for selectivity and
constraints imposed on the [sampled] input” (Fiedler and Juslin 2006, p. 4). That is,
we have little understanding that sampled information can be systematically distorted
due to factors such as sampling error. On this view, we are boundedly rational—here
bounded by our lack of insight into the limited generalizability of the narrow sets of
information that we sample.
According to a second interpretation, people have perfectly rational reasons to
terminate sampling early. Such good reasons may consist in them reckoning with
opportunity costs when they calculate the costs and benefits of search for each further
piece of information, and stopping search as soon as costs outweigh benefits. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, people optimize search with respect to the time, opportunity
costs, money, cognitive effort, and other resources being spent. Such optimization
under constraints (e.g., Sargent 1993; Stigler 1961) sounds plausible at first glance
but can require even more knowledge and computation than unbounded rationality
(e.g., Vriend 1996). Yet, one experimental finding is consistent with this view: When
Hau et al. (2008) increased the monetary stakes by an order of magnitude (relative to
Hertwig et al. 2004), participants responded to the increased incentives and doubled
their search efforts. Not surprisingly, their larger samples permitted them to estimate
more accurately the events’ true probabilities (Hau et al. 2008, Fig. 3).
According to a third interpretation, people—and other animals, for that matter—
may be frugal samplers because small samples have adaptive benefits. In bumblebees,
for instance, the adaptive value of small samples could be related to the clumpy struc-
ture of their natural habitat. Real (1992) explained the argument as follows:
Short-term optimization may be adaptive when there is a high degree of spa-
tial autocorrelation in the distribution of floral rewards. In most field situations,
there is intense local competition among pollinators for floral resources. When
“hot” and “cold” spots in fields of flowers are created through pollinator activity,
then such activity will generate a high degree of spatial autocorrelation in nec-
tar rewards. If information about individual flowers is pooled, then the spatial
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structure of reward distributions will be lost, and foraging over the entire field
will be less efficient. In spatially autocorrelated environments (“rugged land-
scapes”), averaging obscures the true nature of the environment. (p. S135)
Arguments concerning the evolutionary adaptiveness of small samples have also
been made in humans (for brief reviews see e.g., Hertwig and Todd 2003; Juslin et al.
2006). Kareev (1995, 2000), for example, proposed that working memory might have
evolved so as to increase the chance for early detection of covariation. He argued that
the experienced sample size most conducive to the detection of useful correlations
(i.e., value ≥ .5) is close to Miller’s (1956) estimate of the limited capacity of working
memory (7 ± 2). Specifically, he proposed that because of the skew of the sam-
pling distribution of certain correlation measures (e.g., the ϕ coefficient), correlations
observed in small samples more often exceed the population correlation than correla-
tions estimated from larger samples. That is, small samples amplify the correlations,
thus enabling their early detection. This conjecture of the evolutionary advantage of
small samples has fueled a controversial debate (see Juslin et al. 2006).
Could there be any advantage to frugal sampling in decisions from experience? As
pointed out earlier, Hertwig and Pleskac (2008, 2010) proposed one possible advan-
tage that, like Kareev’s (2000), rests on the notion of amplification. Unlike Kareev,
however, they argued that amplification proffers a cognitive rather than an evolutionary
benefit. Through mathematical analysis and computer simulation, Hertwig and Ples-
kac showed that small samples amplify the difference between the options’ average
rewards. That is, drawing small samples from payoff distributions results in experi-
enced differences of sample means that are larger than the objective difference. Take,
for instance, the choice between the following two gambles:
A: $26 with probability .76, 0 otherwise,
B: $48 with probability .55, 0 otherwise
Gamble A has an expected value of $19.76, whereas B’s value is $26.40, which
amounts to a difference of $6.64 in the gambles’ expected values. Choosing between
them appears not overly difficult—especially if the choice comes in the form of a
decision from description. But how difficult is the choice on the basis of a sample of,
say, five draws from either gamble? In a sample of size five, the expected difference
between the sample means is $10.98, 1.7 times larger than the difference of $6.64
(see Hertwig and Pleskac 2008, for the details of this analysis). In other words, this
choice points even more clearly to one alternative. That is, amplified absolute differ-
ences make the choice between gambles simpler, thus explaining the frugal sampling
behavior observed in investigations of decisions from experience—a conjecture for
which Hertwig and Pleskac (2010) found empirical evidence.
Of course, as the old adage of economists goes: “There is no such thing as a free
lunch”. In line with this wisdom, decision makers who are content with small sam-
ples do not get to enjoy for free the simultaneous advantages of small search costs,
low opportunity costs, and amplified differences. The price comes in terms of some-
what inaccurate representations of the gambles’ parameters. Specifically, the amplified
absolute difference will sometimes point toward the objectively inferior gamble. But
how large is that price? Interestingly, more accurate knowledge derived from larger
123
288 Synthese (2012) 187:269–292
samples yields surprisingly modest gains in terms of the probability of selecting the
higher-value distribution (due to the diminishing return of the value of information).
As Hertwig and Pleskac (2008) showed in an analysis involving an environment of
1,000 pairs of randomly generated two-outcome gambles, choices based on small
samples, albeit not optimal, are surprisingly competitive. For instance, with a sample
as minute as one draw from each gamble, a person has an approximate 60% chance of
selecting the higher-expected value gamble. With five draws from each gamble, this
chance already amounts to 78% (assuming the natural-mean heuristic as the choice
strategy). To now reach about the same increase in accuracy—from a 78% to a 95%
chance of selecting the higher-expected value gamble—a person would have to draw
one hundred observations. That is, accuracy continues to increase with each further
draw, but at a diminishing rate.
To sum, there is more than one interpretation of the rationality or lack thereof of
people’s reliance on small samples in decisions from experience. Dependent on one’s
view, one could see it as the naı¨veté of boundedly rational intuitive statisticians, as
rational behavior of optimizers under constraints, or as the consequence of an ampli-
fication effect that renders choice easier at a surprisingly small cost.
Let us conclude with one last remark on the (bounded) rationality of decisions from
experience. Our discussion so far has been concerned with the accuracy of people’s
beliefs about the likelihood of events in the world. It could turn out that their calibra-
tion may not be key for how good or bad people’s decisions from experience are. The
reason is that if people evaluate gambles using simple outcomes heuristics such as the
maximax heuristic, then event probabilities will not even enter their calculations. If
associative learning strategies describe the processes best, then factors such as recency
will limit the amount and accuracy of information regardless of how much informa-
tion about event frequencies a person sampled. If, however, the natural-mean heuristic
proves to be a good model of decisions from experience, then this simple strategy
will permit people to act in accordance with expected value theory, thus conforming
to two processes—weighting and summing—that are often used to describe the core
of rational choice (on which numerous descriptive and normative theories of human
behavior rest, including expected value theory, expected utility theory, prospect theory,
Benjamin Franklin’s moral algebra, and theories of moral sense such as utilitarianism
and consequentialism; see Brandstätter et al. 2006). With weighting and summing, the
rational decision maker can make a tradeoff between, say, high returns with low prob-
abilities and low returns with high probabilities. Ironically, the natural-mean heuristic
achieves this tradeoff without forming an explicit representation of the probabilities
of monetary outcomes, and without weighting the outcomes by their probabilities.
5 Conclusions
Let us at last return to Mount Vesuvius and to the puzzle that most local residents have a
strong impulse not to budge. Why is that? Perhaps it has become clear by now why the
distinction between decisions from description and experience may be key in under-
standing this and other puzzling risk-taking behavior. Their personal experience tells
residents living in the vicinity of Mount Vesuvius that violent eruptions are extremely
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rare; in fact, in most people’s lifetime, they have been non-existent. Unless catastro-
phes have occurred recently, the relative indifference with which citizens and politi-
cians often consider rare but high-consequence events like bursting levies, catastrophic
earthquakes and eruptions of volcanoes may be owed to the experience of their rarity
(Weber in press). Just as residents in the vicinity of Mount Vesuvius have ignored
incentives to relocate, people living in flood plains who make decisions about insur-
ance based on their personal experience with floods—a rare event—have tended to
turn down even federally-subsidized flood insurance (Kunreuther 1984). We will not
understand how people respond to rare but high-consequence events unless we under-
stand the psychology and rationality of people’s decisions from experience.
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